Civil Society Participation in the Negotiations of the Ten Year Overall Review of WSIS Outcomes

EDITED BY ADITI GUPTA
WRITTEN BY PUNEETH NAGARAJ
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1. Research: Noel Johns, a student of NALSAR University of Law, provided valuable assistance in the completion of this report.
INTRODUCTION

The High Level Meeting of the UN General Assembly, which took place on 15-16th December 2015, brought to an end the Overall Review of the Implementation of the Outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). With a mandate from the 2005 Summit to review the outcomes of the Tunis Agenda, the WSIS Review (also commonly known as WSIS+10) began in 2013 with consultations between the different implementing agencies of the United Nations. The Review was supposed to both take stock of developments in the information society in the intervening decade and re-examine the consensus built through the Tunis Agenda. In its last six months, the process shifted to the UN General Assembly under whose auspices the final negotiations took place.

Just as the WSIS Summit sought to address pressing issues of the day a decade ago, the WSIS+10 Review was an opportunity to address challenges facing today’s global community, including the growing need to harness the potential of ICT for development, the relationship between ICTs and human rights, and the roles and responsibilities of different actors in internet governance. WSIS is currently the only UN framework that addresses these issues and explicitly looks at the link between ICTs, human rights, governance, and development. As a high level political framework with normative value, it will continue to guide UN agencies, national governments, and other actors in their efforts to shape the information society for years to come. For the Review process to be meaningful, the participation of civil society voices pushing forward public interest perspectives in the negotiation process was crucial. With this in mind, this report aims to explore and critically examine civil society engagement in the Review and identify the lessons learned.

Our study focuses on the role civil society actors played in the 2015 WSIS Review negotiation process. Envisioned as a multistakeholder summit in 2001, the Review process underwent a transformation of sorts at the UN General Assembly, with states taking on a more prominent role. As the space afforded to stakeholder groups narrowed, the nature of engagement also changed.

Studies on civil society participation by Klein, Padovani, and O’Siochru, among others, were carried out at the completion of the Tunis phase of the WSIS process. This report is an attempt to perform a similar analysis of the Review process. The report also makes recommendations based on the experience of civil society representatives from around the world. The recommendations are made with a view to improve civil society engagement in the next decade of the WSIS as well as within the larger global internet governance landscape.

This report is divided into four sections. The first provides a background to the WSIS process and the evolution of substantive issues over the last decade leading up to the WSIS+10 Review. It also examines the space available for civil society

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3. Infra, note 12.
participation in the WSIS process over the last decade. The second section analyses the extent of civil society participation in the WSIS+10 Review. It identifies the actors involved, the methods employed and the barriers faced by civil society in participating in the Review process. Following this, the third section examines the substantive issues on which civil society engaged with the process, and assesses the impact civil society engagement had on the final outcome of the Review. The fourth section makes recommendations based on learnings from sections 2 and 3.

**METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE**

This report is based on two forms of primary data. First, a survey circulated among civil society representatives who participated in the WSIS process. Second, official submissions made by civil society organisations at various levels of the WSIS+10 negotiations. About 49 (96 including endorsements and joint submissions) civil society organisations submitted comments through the WSIS process. This includes organisations that have submitted at least one written comment into the Review process. As such, this represents the upper limit of participation in the WSIS+10 process. The survey had 19 responses from 11 countries, which represents a good, although not wholly representative, sample of the civil society actors who participated in the Review – we see this as sufficient to offer a diverse range of perspectives on the experience of participating in the WSIS+10 process as a civil society stakeholder. Desk research on academic and policy based writing on the WSIS process since its inception informs the larger discourse in this report and its framing.

Conceptually, the report draws on a similar paper by Bart Cammaerts that carried out a qualitative analysis of civil society positions and participatory processes during the first two phases of the WSIS. Cammaerts’ approach is used in evaluating the WSIS+10 negotiations from the lens of access and participation. The survey informs some of these questions. In using a survey as opposed to relying on official UN lists of participation, this report is a departure from a similar paper by Cammaerts and Carpenter: which relied on accreditation lists. This is because the list of registered participants released by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) during the Review tended to overestimate the actual participation of stakeholders. There are a number of possible reasons for this, including availability of funding, accessibility of process and the location of the meeting, which will be elaborated on further in the pages to follow. To evaluate the substantive impact of civil society participation, the report relies on official written submissions to the UNGA.

In terms of scope, the report is limited to the negotiation process of the WSIS+10 Review which started on 1st June 2015 with the appointment of co-facilitators by the UN General Assembly and concluded on 16th December 2015 with the High Level Meeting.

At this stage, it is important to clarify what ‘civil society’ refers to in this report. The term is contested in international governance, and the WSIS process is no exception. As Mueller notes, civil society is ‘a diverse assembly of groups, networks and movements, containing a variety of viewpoints and positions on practically all of the subjects on the agenda at the WSIS’. Given the complexities involved in defining civil society, this report does not attempt to define it. Instead, we rely on four broad categories of actors, who participated in the Review process under the self-identified umbrella of civil society.

This includes 1) actors/organisations who represented the civil society stakeholder group at the WSIS meetings; 2) organisations that submitted written comments on the Outcome Document as civil society stakeholders; 3) actors/organisations who participated in regional or domestic WSIS related events as civil society stakeholders and 4) civil society representatives who commented on the WSIS process through opinion pieces or other forms of writing external to the WSIS process. The categorisation also extends to non-technical academia representatives who also participated under the broad civil society umbrella. This is because they were not identified as a separate stakeholder category. As a result, many academics participated in the WSIS+10 process as civil society representatives. The civil society representatives who served on the High Level Meeting speaker selection panel also attest to the elision of academia and civil society.
The origins of a summit for information society in the UN system can be traced back to the Earth Summit in 1992. With a view to involve a wide range of stakeholder groups in decision-making on a number of issues, the UN held roughly one Summit a year from the Earth Summit to the WSIS Summit (2003-2005). This coincided with discussions in a number of UN agencies on addressing the digital divide. This section describes the evolution of the process, issues and the space for stakeholder engagement in the WSIS process.

Scholars first began to study the increasing importance of information to society as far back as the 1970s.1 This was also when actors from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) began to push for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) at the international level. Many commentators have begun to point out that discussions that began with the NWICO helped frame many of the debates during the WSIS process.2

The more recent history of the WSIS process starts in the early 1990s as policy bodies at both the domestic and international levels began to address issues related to the ‘information society’. Notable among these efforts was the European Commission’s Bangemann Report on Europe and the Global Information Society.3 At the international level, UNCTAD began to discuss an idea for a ‘Conference on Information and Communication Development’ in 1996.4 However, this was a non-starter.

The ITU, which was keen to assert its position in the internet governance landscape, proved to be a more appropriate forum to host the summit. At its First Plenipotentiary in 1998 the ITU accepted a proposal from Tunisia to organise a summit on the information society.

In 2001, the UN General Assembly, on the recommendation of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) passed a resolution to hold the Summit over two phases in Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005), with the first Summit to be held over two phases. Preparatory Committee meetings or ‘PrepComs’ were held in the lead up to the two phases of the Summit. UNGA Resolution 56/183 was significant as it called for the involvement of other stakeholders, the modalities of which were to be worked out during the PrepComs. However, it has been argued that states played a big role in these negotiations, narrowing the space for civil society actors.5 In addition, regional meetings were held to gather views from around the world to seed into the Summit. See Figure 1 for a timeline of the first two phases of the WSIS.

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**Table: Regional Conferences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Bucharest (Romania)</td>
<td>7-9th Nov 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>Rio de Janeiro (Brazil)</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-pacific</td>
<td>Tokyo (Japan)</td>
<td>13-15th Jan 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>Bamako (Mali)</td>
<td>25-30th May 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>Havana (Cuba)</td>
<td>13-15th Jan 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first phase in Geneva produced the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action. They were a broad set of principles that highlighted the important issues that faced the information society. By the Geneva phase, the agenda of the Summit had expanded from its original mandate of addressing the digital divide. The Geneva Declaration of Principles is notable for highlighting a number of issues ranging from internet governance to cybersecurity, development and capacity building.6 The Geneva Declaration was complemented by the Plan of Action which set out a roadmap for further discussion in the Tunis phase.7

The second phase in Tunis in 2005 was meant to put these plans into motion by achieving consensus on many contentious issues. The Tunis Agenda for the information society is a consensus statement that was an outcome of the second phase.8 An important outcome of the Tunis Agenda was the establishment of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The Tunis Agenda also called for a Review of outcomes by the UN General Assembly in 2015. The negotiations started in June 2015 with the appointment of the co-facilitators.

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**EVALUATION OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES**

When the idea for a Summit was first proposed, it was to address the growing digital divide at the turn of the millennium. However, as discussions began in the PrepComs and with stakeholders, many new issues were put on the agenda. Chief amongst these was the issue of internet governance as there was a need to clarify the role of various stakeholders and institutions in global internet government.9

The Tunis Agenda – which serves as an action document – covers three broad issues: Financial Mechanisms for ICT for Development; Internet Governance; and Implementation and Follow-Up. However, this is not a reflection of the range of issues that were discussed in the Geneva and Tunis phases. Human rights, which was a priority issue for civil society groups and discussed at length, is mentioned only twice in the Tunis Agenda (unlike the Geneva Declaration of Principles). Issues that were important to states, however, were prominent within the document; for example, cybersecurity is present as a horizontal issue across categories. On the whole, the first two phases of the WSIS focused on a narrow range of issues.10

Ten years on, the information society has grown enormously. Many of the issues discussed in 2005 have gained importance in new contexts. The 2015 Outcome Document is a reflection of this reality, adding sections on human rights and...
cybersecurity to the Tunis list and allowing for a more nuanced debate on these issues. While all stakeholders were not happy with the detail or depth of the document on many issues, there is no doubt it represents a significant expansion of the WSIS mandate.

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE WSIS PROCESS

Summits within the UN system are notable for the involvement of large stakeholder communities in discussion and decision-making processes. They are typically attended by thousands of representatives, and the two phases of the WSIS were no exception. It is estimated that almost 6000 civil society representatives out of over 18,000 total participants (from 174 countries) were involved in the first two phases of the Summit.16 Civil society helped influence discussions on a number of issues, although they were unable to participate in the actual decision-making.17

The Summit was notable for having a dedicated Civil Society Division (CSD) “to facilitate the full participation of civil society in the preparatory process leading up to the Summit.”18 The CSD was set up in line with the mandate to have a Tripartite Secretariat for the Summit. This meant that the Secretariat had three divisions to represent the respective stakeholder categories of government, civil society and the private sector. The CSD was instrumental in setting up interactions with other stakeholder groups as well as UN bodies to allow for greater participation of civil society in the Summit.19 However, civil society groups faced procedural difficulties in being able to participate in PrepComs and other decision making bodies. To deal with the procedural aspects of civil society participation, a Civil Society Bureau (CSB) was established during PrepCom 2.20 On substantive issues, however, civil society played an important role in providing inputs into the WSIS process. In working groups, civil society representatives’ expertise on internet governance issues translated into the outcomes and the final language of many of the Summit documents.21

In the WSIS+10 negotiations, it can be argued that the space for civil society participation had shrunk. This is primarily because the Review was hosted at the UN General Assembly, which meant that – unlike the Summit – did not hold a mandate to facilitate the full participation of civil society. Since the negotiations were driven by states rather than a Tripartite Secretariat, the influence civil society could have was similarly reduced. This is not to say that civil society played a diminished role in the Review. Through written submissions, informal interaction sessions and coordination meetings, civil society still influenced the agenda. It did, however, lack the kind of institutional support the CSD or CSB [would have] provided. The following section discusses civil society participation in greater detail by highlighting the barriers faced by civil society groups in the WSIS+10 negotiations and the means employed for engagement.

13. Supra, note 24 at pp. 333-335.
14. Supra, note 24 at p. 316.
15. Supra, note 24 at p. 316.
among the organisations that do not have a global reach, 71% operate in the
Global South and 29% operate in the Global North. However, if we were to compare
participation from the Global South to all other organisations, we find that 52% or
organisations were from the Global South whereas 48% were either organisations with a
global reach or from the Global North.

Respondents to our survey operated globally, regionally or nationally. The following is
the breakdown of organisations by their sphere of operation. As mentioned earlier, 26%
of organisations operated globally; 37% percent operated nationally and another 37%
operated regionally.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sphere of Operation</th>
<th>Number of Organisation</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe and Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We find that there was a fairly even distribution of participants across geographies.
However, this does not account for the level of engagement with the process.

Length of Engagement

The findings in the previous section are based on an organisation participating in at
least one meeting. However, the barrier that most Global South organisations face is the
inability to attend meetings regularly. For this reason, we first filter out organisations
that have at least attended 3 meetings (as 3 is the median figure). We find that about
52% of organisations have attended less than 3 meetings and 48% of organisations
have attended three or more meetings. Of the 9 organisations that have attended less
than three meetings, six came from the Global South, two from the Global North and one
operated globally. Of the ten organisations that have attended three or more meetings,
five operated in the Global South, three operate globally and two operate in the Global
North. If we increase the threshold to five meetings, we find that only one organisation
from the Global South meets the threshold as opposed to four operating globally or in the
Global North.

Therefore, we find that while developing country actors can participate in meetings, they
are not able to do so as consistently as those from developed countries. Full participation
in WSIS meetings is still out of reach for actors from the Global South.

Barriers to Participation

In our survey, we asked participants to list the barriers they faced in participating in the
WSIS+10 process. As the responses were descriptive, respondents could give multiple
responses. In total, there were 7 different categories of responses. They are listed below with
illuminative examples:

When the president of the UNGA (from the Republic of Uganda) appointed the
governments of Latvia and United Arab Emirates to co-facilitate the process. The Review,
unlike the Summit, was hosted by the UN General Assembly. The negotiation process
reflects this, with states playing a predominant role and many of the negotiations
conducted behind closed doors. The Review, unlike the Summit, was hosted by the UN General Assembly. The negotiation process reflects this, with states playing a predominant role and many of the negotiations conducted behind closed doors. Figure 2 below presents the timeline of the Review process at the General Assembly.
In total there were 30 barriers identified across 7 categories. Of these, ‘Process’ was the most commonly cited barrier, with 7 respondents identifying Process-related barriers. This was followed by Funding (5); Institutional Knowledge (5); Technical Capacity (4); Location (4); Resources (3); and Language (2).

We find that the most commonly cited barriers (Process, Funding and Institutional Knowledge) are those that relate to the way the UNGA functions as opposed to other internet governance institutions. The process not being transparent or accessible is a direct consequence of the UNGA hosting the WSIS+10 Review. As the Review was subject to the vagaries of UNGA processes, there was no clear mandate to make it more accessible to non-governmental stakeholders. For instance, Respondent No. 10 points out:

‘While it was commendable that the UN General Assembly facilitated written contributions from civil society and our participation in “stakeholder consultation” days, the opportunities to engage did not adequately feed into the formal process. More efforts could have been made to integrate input from other stakeholders to the intergovernmental meetings, for example allowing civil society to attend and intervene during intergovernmental sessions (there is precedent for this within the UN):’

Similarly, Respondent No 2 states that:

‘The earlier events were fairly open, given that non-ECOSOC accredited NGOs were able to apply and accepted to participate. However, the last 30 days or so leading up to the High Level Event in December were much more closed. Governments negotiated and civil society largely did not hear about the latest drafts until a few days after they were finished. Above all, civil society had no formal mechanism to participate over the last month or so – the most crucial time when the final text was being decided.’

Funding, the other major obstacle identified by respondents, can also be attributed to the limitations of a UNGA-run process. In the internet governance universe, institutions like ICANN6 offer fellowships to enable participants with funding problems to be able to participate in their meetings. With the exception of a few civil society or technical community opportunities, there were no institutionalised funding opportunities in the WSIS+10 process.

This is confirmed by responses to a related question on how participatory the process was. On a scale of 5, only 15%, or 3 respondents felt that the WSIS+10 process had adequate formal opportunities to participate. The overwhelming majority of respondents believed that it was inadequate or needed reform. The results are represented in Figure 3 below.

The survey reported in this section sheds light on the obstacles civil society actors had to face in order to engage meaningfully within the process. It found that civil society did not have adequate means of formal engagement with the WSIS+10 negotiations in the absence of institutional support on the lines of the CSB to facilitate participation, and that while participation was evenly distributed across geographies, full participation or continuous engagement remained out of reach for developing country organisations. Finally, it found that many barriers could be addressed by the UNGA itself. However, wider structural issues – particularly related to capacity, resources, and language (barriers 3 – 7 in figure x) – perhaps require some soul-searching among civil society groups as well.

METHODS

In the absence of institutional mechanisms like the CSD or CSB during the Review process, civil society participation took on a different character from the Summit. Though civil society never engaged en bloc with other stakeholders or the UNGA, there were other methods employed by civil society actors to participate in the WSIS+10 negotiations. We have identified four ways in which civil society participated in the process: 1) Written Inputs into the UNGA Review, 2) Attending Physical WSIS-related Meetings, 3) Participating in Regional or Domestic Meetings 4) Civil Society Coordination Efforts.

Examination of these four methods of participation together aims to shed light on the broader picture of civil society engagement in the Review process. As noted below, some of these methods – like joint civil society submissions – helped overcome the barriers outlined in the previous section. Others, like coordination around meetings, helped fill the gap of institutionalised engagement.

Written Submissions

In the preparatory process, the UNGA through the co-facilitators created formal avenues for stakeholder engagement. One such avenue was through written submissions on the eventual Outcome Document. There were three windows (Figure 2) in which stakeholders could submit comments on the documents produced by the co-facilitators in consultation with stakeholder groups. This started off as an open process with all views taken on board. As the negotiations drew to a close, the scope for comments also narrowed. The last few rounds of negotiations happened behind closed doors with little to no input from stakeholders.

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6. ICANN Meeting Fellowships available at <https://www.icann.org/fellowshipprogram>.
Civil society groups took advantage of this opportunity with as many as 49 organisations (96 including endorsements) and coalitions representing close to 30 countries across all regions submitting comments at different phases of the WSIS+10 negotiations. These submissions included joint efforts based on region – like the Pattaya Key Messages,35 existing coalitions like the JustNet Coalition36 and some creative, cross-cutting submissions like the BRICS Civil Society submission.37 In addition, there was also a coalition of around civil society groups which submitted joint comments on the Zero Draft.38 These efforts contributed to offsetting the lack of formal coordination in the Review process through an improvised bottom-up process, utilising existing civil society networks and using online forms of information-sharing and mailing lists.

Attending Physical Meetings

Negotiations for the WSIS+10 Review happened over a six-month period, with all meetings taking place at the UNGA in New York. Of these, only a few were open to stakeholder groups. Stakeholders including civil society could participate in the two Informal Interactive Consultation Meetings held in July and October 2015. In addition, the co-facilitators attended the 2015 Internet Governance Forum (IGF) where stakeholders had the opportunity to engage with them.39 Civil society members also had the chance to observe the Preparatory Meetings in July and October.40 Finally, civil society representatives also had the opportunity to address the High Level Meeting of the UNGA in December, after consensus was reached on the Outcome Document by Member States.

However, the fact that the meetings were held in New York and at times clashing with other international meetings (like ICANN 54), and the costs and visa requirements necessary for flying to New York, created obstacles for many civil society representatives in participating in these meetings. The group of civil society representatives who managed to secure accreditation and funding to attend these meetings formed a loose coalition, as mentioned in the previous section (see Written Submissions).41 This coalition was involved in disseminating information to the wider civil society network and also engaged with negotiators via online channels, feeding through joint civil society priorities and sharing strategic information gained from engaging with negotiators (see Coordination).

Participating in Regional/National Level Meetings

Attending physical meetings at the UNGA was not the only avenue for civil society participation. There were many regional and national level meetings that fed into the WSIS+10 process or into the larger civil society coordination effort. In the Asia-Pacific Region, a meeting of civil society representatives was organised in Pattaya. In the African region, the African IGF was organised in September during the WSIS negotiation schedule. This allowed regional groups to reflect on the WSIS+10 negotiations. Many national level meetings took place too. In India, for instance, the government convened two roundtable meetings of all stakeholders in September and October42 in an effort to gather views on India’s official submissions on the non-paper and Zero Draft respectively. The government’s decision to hold these consultations came after public briefings on internet governance related issues organised by civil society and academia; a successful example of engagement.

Regional and national level meetings were another avenue for civil society groups from the Global South to participate in the WSIS+10 process. They offered an opportunity to discuss WSIS+10 issues for those who could not afford to travel to New York to participate in the actual negotiations.43 Unlike in the Tunis phase, there were no planned regional meetings that fed into the larger WSIS+10 negotiations.

Coordination of Efforts

Despite the absence of institutionalised coordination of civil society engagement during the WSIS+10 negotiations, civil society groups were able to present a joint effort on many fronts. The internet played a big role in enabling this level of coordination. Mailing lists were used for knowledge dissemination and to discuss substantive issues during the Summit.44 Ten years after the Tunis phase, mailing lists have become a forum through which many institutional civil society processes have been managed, and existing knowledge dissemination efforts have expanded.

The number of mailing lists have expanded since the Tunis phase to include a WSIS-specific list (the WSIS+10 BestBits list).45 These lists were used by civil society actors for a number of functions. First, it served as an online convening space for civil society nomination processes. Mailing lists like BestBits, Internet Governance Caucus and the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group have long served the purpose of nominating civil society representatives to various internet governance forums like the IGF MAG (Multistakeholder Advisory Group), and WGECE (Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation), to name only a few. In the Review process, these lists were used to nominate civil society speakers for the High Level Meeting of the General Assembly and to convene a selection committee to select the speakers (incidentally, this was not without controversy, with questions raised regarding the UN DESA’s replacement of certain speakers for the High Level Meeting). The mailing lists were also used to make process-related announcements to inform the larger community of the schedule and opportunities for engagement in the Review process.

Second, mailing lists were a platform for knowledge dissemination and capacity building. Civil society groups like the Diplo Foundation and Global Partners Digital (GPD) also organised webinars to build capacity within their networks to enable representatives to engage more effectively in the WSIS+10 negotiations. These webinars shared information on the Review process itself, and provided an opportunity for stakeholders to ask questions to experts in the field.

Third, in some situations mailing lists also afforded the opportunity for substantive engagement on issues being discussed in the Review. Some joint submissions to the Review – like the BRICS Civil Society comment – were born out of discussions on the mailing lists. Others used the lists to canvas for support in favour of joint submissions to project the support of diverse voices in their submissions, or to call for more openness and transparency of the Review process itself. The most notable of these efforts was a letter addressed to the President of the UNGA in June 2015 by a coalition of civil society groups. The letter called for a transparent and participative process which allowed for meaningful stakeholder inclusion, highlighting the need to engage with a diverse range of actors and to ensure that voices from developing countries are heard.

In addition to coordination online, there were successful coalitions built offline around WSIS meetings. These include the cross-community meeting (between civil society and the private sector) held on the sidelines of the UN ESCO Connecting the Dots conference46 and the civil society coordination meeting held in the run up to the 2nd Preparatory Meeting. The latter resulted in joint input into the Zero Draft of the WSIS+10 Review.47

17. This coalition was formed after the Civil Society Coordination Meeting held in October 2015 and coordinated their efforts online and at subsequent Internet Governance Meetings.
19. Available at <http://mailing.in/wsisi0- reviews>/.
20. Available at <http://mailing.in/wsisi0-zero- draft/).
21. The Indian government for instance organised multistakeholder roundtables before two submission with a view to frame the official government submission to the WSIS+10 process.
22. Sapiro, note 25, at p. 166.
Civil society actors faced many barriers to meaningful participation in the Review, with the space for engagement markedly narrower than that offered at the early stages of the WSIS process. Despite this, we find that the WSIS+10 negotiations saw civil society participating in the process at various levels and capacities. This was aided in part by coordination efforts by civil society coalitions online and offline. As our survey suggests, over half the respondents (10) thought that civil society coordination and coalitions were very effective in representing civil society interests at the UN GA (see Figure 4 above). This was evident in cases of more substantive engagement, where coordination helped put forward priority issues through joint submissions and coalitions. However, as noted in the previous section, many barriers identified by civil society actors relate to larger structural issues which may need to be resolved at an institutional level.

Figure 4: Effectiveness of Civil Society Coordination

Summary

Civil society actors faced many barriers to meaningful participation in the Review, with the space for engagement markedly narrower than that offered at the early stages of the WSIS process. Despite this, we find that the WSIS+10 negotiations saw civil society participating in the process at various levels and capacities. This was aided in part by coordination efforts by civil society coalitions online and offline. As our survey suggests, over half the respondents (10) thought that civil society coordination and coalitions were very effective in representing civil society interests at the UN GA (see Figure 4 above). This was evident in cases of more substantive engagement, where coordination helped put forward priority issues through joint submissions and coalitions. However, as noted in the previous section, many barriers identified by civil society actors relate to larger structural issues which may need to be resolved at an institutional level.

Figure 4: Effectiveness of Civil Society Coordination

While we do not make any claims of causation based on our analysis, interactions with government stakeholders during and after the negotiations suggests that language suggested by civil society actors was useful in negotiating the Outcome Document.

4. Supra, note 51.
6. Supra, note 51.
8. Supra, note 51, at p. 5.
and the need to insert human rights language into all access-related discussions.\textsuperscript{12} Human rights language on access also extended to the inclusion of human rights language as a necessary condition to development.\textsuperscript{13} Some others also pushed for the embedding of human rights into development programmes. Owing to the complicated nature of the Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF), there was a call for more IGF focused funding in development assistance.\textsuperscript{14} But, there was no clarity on how this would be operationalised given the issues with the DSF.

**Internet Governance**

There was near unanimity on extending the IGF mandate by 10 years, as was the case with the recognition of multistakeholder models of governance as the way forward in the WSIS. The extension of the IGF mandate was supported on the condition that reforms be carried out to make the institution more open, inclusive, accountable and transparent. A component of this was the call for full participation and greater diversity in internet governance meetings, including funding for participants from the Global South.\textsuperscript{15} In the same vein, there was a push for openness, and inclusion in decision making.\textsuperscript{16} Some groups also sought more evidence in ICT and internet governance policy-making (Respondent 16). Some comments sought clarity - or action - on the issue of Enhanced Cooperation.\textsuperscript{17}

**Cybersecurity**

There was opposition to the inclusion of language on cybersecurity without recognition of the attendant human rights concerns.\textsuperscript{18} The groups that did engage with the question sought to make the process of information sharing and mutual legal assistance more effective.\textsuperscript{19} Others stressed the confidence building aspect of cybersecurity to call for greater protection of at-risk ICT users.\textsuperscript{20}

**Follow Up and Implementation**

There was some debate internally on the future modalities of the WSIS process. A significant number of civil society representatives preferred a Summit\textsuperscript{21} to another Review Process. This was because of the reduced space afforded to civil society participation in the Review. While all civil society groups agreed that the next process should be more open, transparent and inclusive, some groups preferred a Review given the resources and planning required to conduct a Summit. There was widespread agreement on linking the follow up of the WSIS to the SDG Reviews.

**How much Impact did Civil Society Have?**

Having outlined civil society groups’ views on the substantive issues involved in the Review, we will now compare the positions taken by civil society to the final Outcome Document. This should give us an idea of how much impact civil society groups had on the substantive outcome of the WSIS+10 negotiations.

**Human Rights**

The inclusion of a separate section on human rights was perhaps the most significant impact of civil society engagement in the WSIS+10. In the face of resistance from many countries, the section of human rights survived. However, many of the more nuanced civil society positions were dropped in this bargain. The language on privacy was diluted, whereas language in the Outcome Document does not mention economic, social and cultural rights (such as education, cultural diversity etc., as contained in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), nor the acknowledgement of the right to access called for by civil society. Holding businesses responsible for upholding and respecting human rights is not mentioned in the Document.

**Digital Divide and Development**

The Outcome Document made several references to linking the WSIS process with the SDGs. However, it did not identify specific goals it could be linked to. While civil society actors sought this linkage, it was not the only stakeholder group to do so. Hence, the inclusion of SDGs in the Outcome Document cannot be solely attributed to civil society. The Document also recognised the gendered nature of the digital divide, although it did not recognise other categories of marginalisation. Net neutrality was not mentioned nor was language on the right to access. On the subject of creating an enabling environment, the importance of education and creating content in local languages was recognised, but the role of the public sector was ignored. The Outcome Document also highlighted the need for an innovative financial mechanism to support development projects.

**Internet Governance**

The mandate of the IGF is extended by 10 years as per the Outcome Document. The extension is also predicated on implementing the recommendations of the Working Group on Improvements to the IGF. The extension also called for working out the modalities to enable participation from developing countries. Similar to the SDGs, the calls to extend the mandate of the IGF came from a broad range of stakeholders, however the call to implement reforms on the IGF were certainly driven by civil society. There was also support for better evidence in policymaking in the Outcome Document. On Enhanced Cooperation, the Document handed the WGECA a renewed mandate. However, on multistakeholder approaches to policymaking, the language proposed by civil society and other stakeholders was not used. Rather than prioritising multistakeholder approaches to governance, this term was used in addition to multilateralism, diluting its significance.

**Cybersecurity**

The Document mentioned the role all stakeholders, including civil society, play in cybersecurity. However, the section on cybersecurity did not recognise a human rights approach or the need to protect at-risk users.

**Follow Up and Implementation**

The Outcome Document calls for a Review in 2025. It also links the SDG Review to the WSIS Review.

**Summary**

As has been shown, civil society’s interests were not very different from other stakeholders’ on a number of issues like SDGs, extension to the IGF and some aspects of bridging the digital divide. The biggest impact of civil society was perhaps on the inclusion of a section on human rights. Broadly, it can be concluded like civil society interests were considered during the negotiations. Our survey raised the question of impact and this conclusion is supported. Most of the respondents agreed that some of their priorities were reflected in the outcome. Only 5 respondents indicated that their priorities were not reflected in the Outcome Document (by answering 1 or 2). This is represented in Figure 5 below:
CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TEN YEAR OVERALL REVIEW OF WSIS OUTCOMES

Q9. To what extent were your initial priorities and objectives reflected in the final outcomes?

![Graph showing the rating of the reflecting of priorities and objectives in the final outcomes.](Image)

No. of Responses. 1 = Priorities not reflected at all. 5 = Outcomes mirrored out expectations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the discussion in the preceding section with respect to civil society participation and barriers faced by civil society actors in the WSIS+10 Review, this section makes recommendations that will help civil society engagement to be more effective over the next decade. The recommendations are broadly categorised into process and substantive recommendations.

The process recommendations are aimed at informing engagement with internet governance institutions, with particular reference to UN processes such as the WSIS. They are based on the evolution of civil society engagement with the WSIS process over the last decade and the experience of civil society representatives during the Review. The process recommendations keep in mind the stated goal of the WSIS process of ‘full and effective participation’ of all stakeholders. In particular, they are aimed at overcoming the obstacles identified by civil society groups in participating in the Review. The appropriate forum for the respective recommendations are also highlighted below.

The substantive recommendations are aimed at providing an agenda for civil society engagement in the next decade. Many of the priority issues identified by civil society actors were indeed raised in the Review negotiations. The next decade will bring up more critical issues that need solutions at the highest level. Based on discussions during the Review process and the civil society survey in this study, these recommendations also identify the forums at which they should be highlighted.

None of these recommendations are novel- many of them having been discussed before at various forums and in different forms. But in the context of the Review, they serve the purpose of informing future engagement with the WSIS process and with other internet governance institutions.

PROCESS RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Institutional Engagement on the Lines of Civil Society Division/Bureau.

Recommendation: Engage with internet governance institutions on the lines of the Civil Society Bureau to make internet governance processes more accessible and transparent.

2. I. Led for the recognition of the right to access to the internet and ICTs, the right to development and stronger language in support of economic, social and cultural rights. In the same vein, the civil society coalition wanted to hold businesses accountable for the respect and implementation of human rights.

3. Recommendation: Engage with internet governance institutions on the lines of the Civil Society Bureau to make internet governance processes more accessible and transparent.
Civil society coordination during the WSIS+10 Review was done largely on an ad-hoc basis. Many of the issues raised by respondents on process can be potentially addressed by a body similar to the CSD. While there was engagement with the UN through the UN DESA, it was not on the scale of the CSB during the Summit. Many of the process and access to information related issues arose from the opaqueness of the Review process administered by the UNGA.

Consistent institutional engagement should be the way forward. The existing Civil Society Coordination Group (CSCG) performs an important role to this end. However, recent discussions point to many constraints such as funding, language and internal processes among others. In UN-administered processes like the WSIS, civil society groups should look to engage with the secretariat (or UN DESA in the case of the Review) from the outset. It might be difficult to recreate an organisation similar to the CSB without the institutional support of a dedicated secretariat. However, the role performed by the CSB in terms of demystifying process is vital to enable civil society participation.

Coordination efforts during the Review performed this function to an extent. But consistent engagement with the DESA and other secretariats is as important as engagement on substantive issues. To this end, future coalitions and civil society groups must dedicate time and resources to engaging with the procedural aspects of IG institutions as well.

II. Funding for Participation

Recommendation: Establish fellowships/other funding for WSIS specific work to improve the diversity of civil society participation.

Forum: UNGA/other UN bodies, or coordinated funding calls in civil society networks.

The Outcome Document makes a passing reference to encouraging participation from developing countries. But it makes no mention of the problem of funding, an issue that has never been addressed in a systematic way. One part of this recommendation is for the UNGA or other UN bodies (ITU, UNESCO) to follow the lead of ICANN and the IGF to institute fellowships to encourage sustained participation from developing countries. If that is not feasible, the second recommendation is to create coalitions across geographies to apply for participation specific funding. Creative coalitions can be established with a view of mentoring representatives from developing countries to engage in a sustained manner with the WSIS process.

III. Accessibility of WSIS Process Related Information

Recommendation: Make information related to meetings and deadlines more accessible to demystify UN procedures.

Forum: UNGA, other UN bodies.

As a complement to recommendation 1, civil society must attempt to demystify the WSIS process since many participants were put off by the complexity of the process and the rules for registration. One way of accomplishing this is by spreading awareness and creating capacity building programmes on lines of existing webinars. Some organisations, like GPD and the Diplo Foundation, did perform this function by organising webinars. Another more crucial component is to attempt to reform the way consultations are conducted by the various WSIS bodies and make their documents more accessible.

SUBSTANTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Digital Human Rights Framework

Recommendation: Work towards the creation of a Framework of Digital Human Rights to address human rights challenges in the next decade of the WSIS.

Forum: Human Rights Council, Other International norm setting bodies.

Including a separate human rights section in the Outcome Document was a significant step for the information society. The long term aim, now must be to highlight the human rights issues that will become important in the next decade. Many of these rights are not guaranteed in most countries or at the international level. Issues like net neutrality, right to access and many economic, social and cultural rights will require a new framework of interpretation. As the WSIS process moves into smaller bodies, highlighting these issues will help diffuse the idea of a new framework of digital human rights in the next decade.

II. Engaging on Cybersecurity

Recommendation: Encourage civil society to participate in cybersecurity discussions to offer a public interest narrative.

Forum: ITU, bilateral and regional cybersecurity arrangements.

Many civil society organisations were agnostic about engaging on cybersecurity issues during the WSIS+10 Review. However, with states relying on businesses for support on many cybersecurity concerns, there is a need for independent, public interest voices to enter the space. While this is a difficult space for civil society to enter, with supportive capacity building programmes it is a field that could greatly benefit from their engagement. The independent voice that civil society can bring is crucial to advance a narrative of individual user rights rather than the prevailing discourse, dominated by national security perspectives.

III. Enhanced Cooperation and IGF

Recommendation: Engage with the CSTD Working Groups on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC) and Implementing Improvements on the IGF to push for more open, inclusive, accountable and transparent approaches.

Forum: CSTD WGEC and IGF.

Two concrete policy outcomes of the WSIS+10 Review were the renewed mandate for the CSTD Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation and the Working Group on implementing improvements to the IGF. Resolving these questions in the immediate future will go a long way in bringing coherence to the WSIS Process. Civil society members must treat these as short term targets as part of the larger WSIS strategy.